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NOTES
SOME ADMINISTRATIVE IMPLICATIONS OF THE
MORGAN DECISIONS
WALLACE MENDELSON*

Pursuant to provisions of the Packers and Stockyards
Act,' Secretary of Agriculture Hyde in 1930 directed an inquiry
into the matter of the reasonableness of the rates charged by
the marketing agencies in the Kansas City Stockyards. As a result of that inquiry a rate order was issued in May 1932. But
because of altered economic conditions the order was vacated
in July 1932 and, after a rehearing before Assistant Secretary
Tugwell, a new rate order was signed and issued on June 14,
1933 by Secretary Wallace. Fifty commission men then sought
a permanent injunction in a Federal District Court against the
enforcement of the order attacking principally on the merits,
but also alleging inter alia that the statutory requirement of a
"full hearing" had not been satisfied because the Secretary
(whom Congress had charged with the rate making responsibility) had not himself heard or read the evidence or argument
submitted and that his sole information in the proceedings had
leen derived from consultation with his departmental employees.
The court granted a temporary restraining order prohibiting
the enforcement of the new rate schedule on condition that the
commission men deposit in court pending the final outcome of
the litigation all funds collected by them in excess of those permissible under the Secretary's rate schedule, and, striking the
procedural allegations, denied the permanent injunction on the
2
merits.
* A. B., 1933, Ph. D., 1940, University of Wisconsin; LL. B., 1936,
Harvard University; Instructor in political science, University of Illinois; member of the Iowa bar.
142 Stat. 159, 166 (1921).
So far as is here pertinent the Statute
provides: "Sec. 310. Whenever . . . after full hearing . . . the Secretary is of the opinion that any rate, charge, regulation or practice of
a stockyard owner or market agency . . . is or will be unjust, unrea-

sonable or discriminatory, the Secretary-(a) May determine and

prescribe what will be the just and reasonable rate or charge .

be thereafter observed in such case . . ."
I Morgan v. U.S., 8 Fed. Supp. 766 (1934).
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In an appeal to the Supreme Court the judgment of the
District Court was reversed and the case remanded solely on
the procedural grounds raised in the stricken allegations. The
crux of the Supreme Court's opinion appears in the following
quotation:
"The (statutory) requirement of a "full hearing" has obvious
reference to the tradition of judicial proceedings in which evidence
is received and heard by the trier of the facts. The "hearing" is
designed to afford the safeguard that the one who decides shall be
bound in good conscience to consider the evidence, to be guided by
that alone, and to reach his conclusions uninfluenced by extraneous
considerations which in other fields might have play in determining
purely executive action. The "hearing" is the hearing of evidence
and argument. If the one who determines the facts which underlie
the order has not considered evidence or argument, it is manifest that
the hearing has not been given."'
Since the District Court had stricken the procedural allegations, the case was remanded to it for further hearing with
the instructions that "The defendants should be required to
answer these allegations, and the question whether plaintiffs had
a proper hearing should be determined.'"'
On retrial Secretary Wallace and members of his staff testified at some length
as to the part which the former had played in the rate order
proceedings. The testimony indicated that (although the hearing had been held before an Assistant Secretary) Secretary
Wallace had read the plaintiff's brief and some portions of the
record and had made his own decision, though relying in part
at least on ex parte consultation with, and memoranda from,
his departmental subordinates. A permanent injunction was
again denied. On appeal the Supreme Court was apparently
satisfied that the requirement indicated in its former opinion
had been met (though this is not entirely clear), but reversed
the lower court's order this time on the procedural ground that:
"The right to a hearing embraces not only the right to present
evidence but also a reasonable opportunity to know the claims of the
'This fiat constitutes the basic decision in the entire Morgan litigation. Since the court itself recognizes that rate-making is legislative in nature, it is hardly obvious (though it might upon examination prove to be true) that Congress intended to require a judicial
and not a legislative hearing analagous to a Congressional committee hearing. Wouldn't the court have done well to have explored
this question more thoroughly? See the Assigned Car Cases, 274
U. S. 64 (1926), and Norwegian Nitrogen Products Co. v. U. S. 288
U. S. 294 (1933) (both involving administrative proceedings) in
which the essentially different natures and purposes of legislative and
judicial hearings is recognized.
'298 U.S. 468, 480.
Ibid., at page 482.
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opposing party and to meet them.

*

*

*

Those who are brought

into contest with the Government in a quasi-judicial proceeding
aimed at the control of their activities are entitled to be fairly
advised of what the Government proposes and to be heard upon its
proposals before it issues its final command.
This second requisite of a "full hearing", it was held had
not been met because the rate inquiry, initiated under a generally worded complaint, did not fully apprise the commission men of the Government's position and because this defect
had not been cured at any subsequent stage of the proceedings.
Thus the actual holdings of the first two Morgan cases in
the abstract seem clear, reasonable and not at all inconsistent
with the effective administrative regulation. They may be epitomized by the following catch phrases from the court's opinions: "The one who decides must hear' "' and he whose action
is the subject of proposed administrative regulation is entitled
"to be fairly advised of what the government proposes and to be
heard" 8 thereon.
But the application of these abstract propositions to the
concrete facts of the administration of the statute in question
is not easy. How can the Secretary of Agriculture in view of
his many other duties be expected to hear in person all of the
evidence and argument where, as in the principal case, the record
of the evidence alone, exclusive of exhibits, exceeded 10,000
pages? How is it possible to specify changes where the proceeding begins simply as an inquiry into existing conditions?
The court was not oblvious to these difficulties. In regard to the
methods by which they might be solved some interesting observations were made suggesting the use of a trial examiner and a
trial examiner's report. Thus in the first Morgan opinion, it
was said that:
1*

* * while it would have been good practice to have the

examiner prepare a report and submit it to the Secretary and the

parties, and to permit exceptions and arguments addressed to the
points thus presented * * * we can not say that that particular

type of proceedure was essential to the validity of the hearing."'

In the second opinion the court referred to the "absence
of any report by the examiner" in deprecatory terms and then
0 304 U. S.1, 18.
7298

U. S. 468, 481.

304 U.S. 1.
'298 U.S. 468, 478
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veconciled this attitude with its former remarks on the following grounds:
"But what would not be essential to the adequacy of the hearing if the Secretary himself makes the findings is not a criterion for a
case in which the Secretary accepts and makes as his own the findings which have been prepared by the active prosecutors for the
Government, after an ex parte discussion with them and without
according any reasonable opportunity to the respondents in the
proceeding to know the claims thus presented and to contest them."
The inferences to be drawn from these observations, it would
seem, are that a trial examiner's report, subject to the right
of the parties to except to, and argue on, points therein presented, may be relied upon to satisfy the Morgan case requirements, as set out above, that is: 1. to specify charges, where, as
in the principal case, that would be impossible at the outset
because the proceeding began as a general inquiry into existing conditions, and 2. to form the basis for the responsible official's (here the Secretary of Agriculture) final order, where
that official does not himself hear (or read) all of the evidence
and argument.
Equally as important in their administrative aspects, however, as the actual holdings of the first two Morgan cases are
the implications which they contain. Outstanding in this connection is the cavalier way in which, the District Court authorized the interrogation of the Secretary of Agriculture in response
to the Supreme Court's instructions that the defendants "be
required to answer" the allegations that the Secretary in making his final order had not considered the evidence or arguments
of the commission men and that his information in the case had
been derived solely from consultation with his subordinates.1 1
"'

304 U. S. 1, 22.

"Immediately after the second Morgan case the N. L. R. B. was
faced in the courts in a considerable number of cases with allegations
"on information and belief that the Board members themselves did
not consider or appraise the evidence or did not make the findings
of fact which were issued as the Board's decision. Such pleading has
usually been supplemented by a motion to require the Board members and others to answer interrogatories, or a motion to make
depositions of the Board members and others, or both." J. Warren
Madden, Handbook of the Assoc. of American Law Schools, Decem-

ber, 1938.
The extent of the threat to efficient administration of the indiscriminate use of interrogatories is evidenced by a request of council
in an N. L. R. B. case for a court order requiring each member of the
N. L. R. B. to answer a list of fifty-seven questions in most minute
detail concerning his conduct in relation to, and method of deciding
a certain case. See New York Times, May 3, 1938. For an excellent
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Modern government, it is submitted, can not possibly operate,
if administrative officials may be called from their duties and
required to explain to a court the manner in which they reach
12
their decisions upon the mere allegation of irregularity.
Another important aspect of the first Morgan case relates
to the problem of the subdelegability of administrative functions. The Secretary of Agriculture in addition to many other
administrative and political duties has been entrusted by Con13
gress with the administration of forty-two regulatory statutes.
It is certainly not psychologically possible for a single man to
do such a job with the personal attention required by the first
two Morgan decisions. Some sort of subdelegation is necessary.
But the Supreme Court said that the question of subdelegation
was not involved and brushed aside the whole matter on the
ground that:
"The Assistant Secretary, who had heard (the evidence and
argument) assumed no responsibility for the findings and order,
and the Secretary, who had not heard, did assume that responsibility.""
One does not want to quibble over words, but it seems clear
that the problem of subdelegation was involved in the sense
that the Secretary had attempted to place at least part of his
hearing-deciding power in' the hands of the Assistant Secretary.
What seems to have bothered the court was the apparent splitting up of the power by delegating the hearing aspect and retaining and deciding aspect without the guarantee of a coordinate exercise of the two. Such an approach, it is submitted, is
excessively narrow and "legalistic" and ignores, in fact precludes the possibility of, any sense of departmental solidarity
or ministerial responsibility.15 Since the Secretary assumed resummary of the difficulties which the first two Morgan decisions
raised in the lower' courts see Aftermath of the Morgan Decisions,
an unsigned note in 25 Iowa Law Review 622 (1940). See also
W. Mendelson, The Public Service Commission of Wisconsin: A Study
in Administrative Procedure, 1940 Wisconsin Law Review 503, 534
(1940).

"This problem is dealt with in the fourth Morgan case. See
page 416, below.
"A. H. Feller, Prospects For the Further Study of Administrative Law, 47 Yale Law Journal 647, 622 (1938).
"298 U. S. 468, 479.

"The English case of Local Gov. Bd. vs. Arlidge, House of
Lords, 1915. A. C. 120, involves substantially the same problem as
that raised in the first Morgan case. A different result was reached
however. Note the remarks of Lord Haldane in his opinion in the
English case: "The Minister at the head of the Board is directly
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sponsibility for the order in question by issuing the same in his
own name, it appears difficult to justify the court in concerning
itself with the methods by which he made his determination.
Under the circumstances this would seem to be a political not
a legal question. 15' Finally, the court's language would seem
to justify the inference that if the Secretary had subdelegated
the entire power to hear and decide the case and issue an ap-

propriate order, the whole proceeding would have been sustained.
This in fact seems to be the only possible formal solution to the
dilemma in which the Secretary is placed by the extent of his
duties on the one hand and the requisites of the first two Morgan
decisions on the other. Such a solution would entail the "atomization" of the Department of Agriculture. 15b
After the invalidation of the Secretary's rate order in the
second Supreme Court decision the District Court ordered the
responsible to Parliament like any other minister. He is responsible
not only for what he himself does, but for all that is done in his
department. The volume of work entrusted to him is very great and
he can not do the great bulk of it himself." It was held that Arlidge
was not entitled: (1) to know who specifically within the department was to decide his case, (2) to argue orally before such person
or persons, nor (3) to see the inspector's report as submitted to such

person or persons. The Report of the Committee on Minister's
Powers (Great Britain, 1932) seems to assume the first proposition,
expressly accepts the second (Sect. III, par. 22, IV) and rejects the
third (Sect. III, par. 22, VI).
" This position apparently is taken by the Supreme Court in the
fourth Morgan decision. See page 416, below. But contrast the
view taken in the Report of the Attorney General's Committee on
Administrative Procedure (1941) in which it is said at page 52, "The
heads of the agency should do personally what the heads purport
to do."
'bThe Attorney General's Committee is apparently willing to
accept this result. "We here recommend similar relief (i.e., subdelegation to department subordinates) so far as the hearing and
initial decision of cases is concerned and have outlined the restricted
nature of the review which should be given those decisions. But that
review should be given by the officials charged with the responsibility for it, and the review so given should include a personal mastery of at least those portions of the records embraced within the
exceptions." Report, page 52.
See L. L. Jaffe, The Report of the Attorney General's Committee
on Administrative Procedure", University of Chicago Law Review

401, 430 (1941). "Here again the committee's recommendation is
based upon a choice between competing conceptions, rather than on
a demonstration that any other system would work positive injustice.
It no doubt feels that the supposed symbolic importance of merely
formal connection with the adjudication has been exagerated or at
least is overborn by the values assumed to arise from personal decision." The "competing conceptions" may be seen respectively in the
Arlidge case and the first Morgan case (or in the fourth and first
Morgan cases).
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funds which had been accumulating in court as a result of the
original temporary restraining order ($586,000. as of November, 1937) to be returned to the commission men. 16 From this
order a third appeal was taken to the Supreme Court. ' In the
meanwhile the Secretary of Agriculture had reopened the original rate-making proceedings for the purpose of correcting the
procedural defects indicated in the first two Morgan decisions
and to issue accordingly a valid order retroactively effective as
of June 14, 1933-the date of his original order.
In the third Morgan case the Supreme Court reversed the
lower court's distribution order and remanded the case to await
the Secretary's determination so as to have an "appropriate
basis for its action" in distributing the impounded funds. The
crux of the decision for present purposes may be paraphrased
thus in the words of the court:
"in construing a statute setting up an administrative agency and
providing for judicial review of its action, court and agency are not
to be regarded as wholly independent and unrelated instrumentalities of justice

. . . Neither body should repeat in this day the

mistake made by courts of law when equity was struggling for recognition as an ameliorating system of justice . . "I The District
Court in staying the Secretary's original order and requiring the
collections in excess thereof to be paid into court "assumed the duty

of making proper distribution of the fund upon termination of the
litigation. The duty was the more important here because the
court's . . . (temporary restraining) order not only deprived the
public of the benefit of lower rates but obstructed any effective
reparation order by the Secretary. .

.

. Due regard for the dis-

charge of the court's own responsibility to the litigants and to the
public and the appropriate exercise of its own discretion in such
manner as to effectuate the policy of the (Packers and Stockyards)
Act and facilitate the system of administration which it has set
up, require retention of the (impounded) fund by the district court
until such time as the Secretary, proceeding with due expedition,
shall have entered a final order in the proceeding pending before

Morgan v. U. S., 24 Fed. Supp. 214 (1938).

17

U.S. v. Morgan, 307 U.S. 183 (1939).
Compare Dean Pound's remark made some thirty-two years
earlier that "The two rival agencies in government are law and

administration." 14 Proc. Amer. Pol. Sci. Assn., (1907) 232, 233.
307 U. S.183, 191, 193, 198.

"The court avoided any general holding that an administrative
body may correct a procedural defect in a rate order and give it

effect as of its original date. But its decision nonetheless takes an

important step to counteract the possibility that its recent willingness to invalidate orders for improper procedure might delay the

effective date of regulation until the completion of a procedurally
perfect proceeding. By holding out to similar litigants the prize of
interim freedom from regulation the likelihood of further delay of
final determination would have been increased because of more frequent and more vigorous procedural objections."
An unsigned note in 53 Harvard Law Review 105, 106 (1939).
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Thereafter (having in the reopened proceedings served the
commission men with the rate order of June 14, 1933, and the
findings in support thereof as a starting point of the new inquiry, having appointed an examiner to take new evidence, and
having submitted the examiner's report to the commission men
and heard their exceptions and arguments) the Secretary of
Agriculture issued an order prescribing the same rates as those
set in the original order of June, 1933, though supported by
somewhat difffferent calculations. Thereupon the Government
moved the District Court to distribute the impounded funds
in accordance with the Secretary's order, but the court (having again authorized the commission men to interrogate the
Secretary for the purpose of determining the propriety of the
reopened rate proceedings) held the new order invalid on pro20
ceedural (and other here irrelevant) grounds.
On appeal the Supreme Court, speaking through Mr. Justice
21
Frankfurther, sustained the Secretary's order on all counts.
With respect to the alleged impropriety of the Secretary's conduct of the proceeding which the commission men strenuously
urged on the basis of the Secretary's own testimony, the court
had this to say:
cc* * * * the short of the business is that the Secretary should

never have been subjected to this examination (by the lower court).
The proceeding before the Secretary 'has a quality resembling that

of a judicial proceeding'. * * * Such an examination of a judge
would be destructive of judicial responsibility. * * * Just as a
judge can not be subjected to such a scrutiny, * * * so the integ'

rity of the administrative process must be equally respected."

Thus succinctly was terminated the threat which has hung
over the administrative process since the first Morgan decision. 23
But methodologically that threat was abolished in exactly the
same manner in which it originated; namely, by analogy to the
judicial process. This in itself should be a sufficient condemnation of such reasoning as a method of determining the propriety or impropriety of administrative procedures.
Curiously the court only a few months earlier in a unanimous opinion written by Mr. Justice Frankfurter had expressly
recognized the weakness of this methodology in the following
terms:
32 Fed. Supp. 546, April, 1940.
" U.S. v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409 (1941).
SIbid., at page 422.
' See footnote 6.

L. J.-6
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"Courts, like other organisms, represent an interplay of form
and function. The history of Anglo-American courts and the more
or less narrowly defined range of their staple business have determined the basic characteristics of trial procedure, the rules of evidence, and the general principles of appellate review. Modern
administrative tribunals are the outgrowth of conditions far different
from those. To a large degree they have been a response to the
felt need of governmental supervision over economic enterprise-a
supervision which could effectively be exercised neither directly
through self-executing legislation nor by the judicial process. That
this movement was natural and its extension inevitable, was a
quarter century ago the opinion of eminent spokesmen of the law.
Perhaps the most striking characteristic of this movement has
been the investiture of administrative agencies with power far
exceeding and different from the conventional judicial modes for
adjusting conflicting claims-modes whereby interested litigants
define the scope of the inquiry and determine the data on which the
judicial judgment is ultimately based. Administrative agencies
have power themselves to initiate inquiry, or, when their authority
is invoked, to control the range of investigations in ascertaining
what is to satisfy the requirements of the public interest in relation to the needs of vast regions and sometimes the whole nation in
the enjoyment of facilities for transportation, communication and
other essential public services. These differences in origin and
function preclude wholesale transplantation (to administrative proceedings) of the rules of procedure, trial and review which have been
envolved from the history and experience of courts."'4

With respect to matters other than those concerning ad-'
ministrative procedure the final (fourth) Morgan decision is
important in the attitude which it exemplifies on the classical
problem of the relationship between administrative agencies
and courts in rate making proceedings. On the past the courts
have in effect made themselves the ultimate arbiters of rate
questions by their insistence in reviewing not only the conclusions of law, but also the findings of fact, of administrative
rate regulating agencies.2 5 To the conventional objection urged
by the commission men in the final Morgan case that the Secretary of Agriculture's findings of fact were not supported by
adequate evidence the court answered briefly:
"To reexamine here with particularity the extensive findings
made by the Secretary and to test them by a record of 1340 printed
pages and thousands of additional exhibits would in itself go a long
way to convert a contest before the Secretary into one before the
courts. * * * We are in the legislative realm of fixing rates.
This is a task of striking a balance and reaching a judgment on
factors beset with doubts and difficulties, uncertainty and speculation. On ultimate analysis the real question is whether the Secretary or a court should make an appraisal of elements having delusive
' Federal Communications Commission v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U. S. 134 (1940).
St. Joseph Stockyards Co. v. United States, 298 U. S. 38 (1936);
Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U.S. 287 (1920).
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certainty. Congress has put the responsibility on the Secretary
and the Constitution does not deny the assignment."

" 313 U. S. 409, 417: Compare Mr. Justice Frankfurter's remarks
in his concurring opinion in Driscoll v. Edison Power & Light Co.,
307 U.S. 104, 122 (1939).
"The determination of utility rateswhat may fairly be exacted from the public and what is adequate
to enlist enterprise-does not present questions of an essentially legal
nature in the sense that legal education and lawyers' learning afford
peculiar competence for their adjustment. Those are matters for
the application of whatever knowledge economics and finance may
bring to the practicalities of business enterprise. The only relevant
function of law in dealing with this intersection of government and
enterprise is to secure observance of those procedural safeguards in
the exercise of legislative powers which are the historic foundations
of due process."
WALLACE MENDELSON

